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For many years the commercial banks throughout the country have worked with
the accounting profession in attempts to obtain complete disclosure of the financial
condition of business and industry as it affects the extension of bank credit. At times,
representatives of the banking group have been publicly critical of the certifications
used in, and omissions from, industry's financial reports.1 Despite this, few
segments of the economy have been more secretive concerning their own financial
condition than the commercial banks. Employing some extremely conservative
accounting practices originally designed to provide an additional measure of protection
for their depositors, the banks have been accused of practicing "concealment iccounting"2 insofar as public reporting is concerned. Until recently, few bank shareholders were well enough informed through banks' financial disclosure to appraise
adequately the quality of their investment in terms of either realistic book values or
earnings per share.
Recent developments have begun to alter banks' attitudes on the subject of
financial disclosure in the interests of investors, and it is the purpose of this article to
review the progress being made in this direction and in developing and implementing
useful and uniform bank accounting principles. The developments to be considered
here are in many respects related to the larger quest of the accounting profession for
increased "uniformity" and "comparability" of financial statements-that is, a narrowing of the range of alternative accounting treatments available in particular circumstances. 8 But banking's accounting problems are often distinguishable from those of
other industries, and the institutional character of banking is such that problems must
be faced and solved on an industry basis. For one thing, bank accounting principles
have been less clearly defined than the principles employed by businesses of other
kinds, and therefore require special attention. Furthermore, bank accounting must
reflect the needs not only of investors but also of bank management, depositors, and
the bank supervisory agencies; these special uses of accounting data further suggest
* Comptroller, Wachovia Bank and Trust Company, Winston-Salem, N.C. Chairman, Accounting
Principles Committee, American Bankers Association; President, The Association for Bank Audit, Control,
and Operations (NABAC).
'E.g., Address by J. Howard Laeri, Vice Chairman of First National City Bank, Before the Credit
Policy Committee of the American Bankers Association, Feb. 1, 1966, reported in N.Y. Tines, Feb. 2, 1966,
at 43, col. 2, and in J. ACCOUNTANCY, March 1966, at 57. For a reply to Laeri's remarks, see Editorial,
A Ban er Looks at Auditors, id. at 31.
' Address by J. L. Robertson, Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
The Association for Bank Audit, Control, and Operations (NABAC) National Convention, Sept. x965.
8 See, e.g., Symposium-Uniormity in FinancialAccounting, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 621 (1965).
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the uniqueness of the accounting problems confronted in banking. Lastly, by
assigning, in 1964, supervisory authority over bank securities registration to the

banking agencies rather than to the SEC, Congress appears to have recognized the
need of banks for specially tailored disclosure requirements and to have strengthened
the case for severing banks' accounting problems from those of industry generally.
I
SOME BACKGROUND ON BANK ACCOUNTING

One explanation for bank accounting's slow progress toward achieving meaningful

disclosure by current investors' standards is the conservatism with which investors
viewed bank stocks until quite recently.4 After the depression of the i93os, investors
treated bank stocks as in a class with bonds, preferred stocks, and mortgages and
were therefore concerned primarily with the book or other liquidation value of
shares. Interest focused on the balance sheet, which was usually the only statement
made available, and market price fluctuated around liquidation value. The close
government supervision of balance sheet preparation and the conservatism of the
accounting principles that were followed tended to invite investor confidence in the
balance sheets on which they were relying, which was probably all right as long
as security was the sole desideratum. It was sometime in the x95os, at about the
same time that banks began to display greater competitiveness and interest in growth
and expansion, that investors began to consider bank stocks as alternatives to industrial common stocks. An immediate need for meaningful income statements thus
arose, and investors and financial analysts found themselves supplied with inadequate information in a form that precluded safe comparisons of one bank with
another or with industrial corporations.
Prior to the Securities Acts Amendments of I964," not a great deal was done to
provide bank shareholders and the investment community with needed information.6
Some larger banks had begun to publish income statements, but most banks limited
their disclosure of their financial affairs to the dissemination of the reports of condition required by the various supervisory authorities. 7 These reports, in forms prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency,' the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal
'See Cates, A Stock Analyst Looks at Uniform Bank Accounting, AUDITGEAM, August 1965, at 12.
'Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (codified in scattered sections of x5 U.S.C.).
'See generally on the pre-existing regulatory situation and the practices of banks in supplying financial
data, SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., istSere.,
Pt. 3, at 36-39 (x963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY REPORT]; STAFF OF SUBCOMm. ON DoMsrsTi
FINANCE, HOUSE Comm. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
THE MARKET FOR BANK
STOCK 18-25 (Subcomm. Print 1964); E. LERNER, STAFF OF SuBcoasss. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE, Housn
CoMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY,

88TH CONG., 2D SESS., COMMERCIAL BANK REPORTING PRACTICES TO

STOC~xHOLDEES (Subcomm. Print x964).

"A good survey of the requirements of bank supervisors and the problems of analyzing the limited
data disclosed is R. D. KENNEDY & S. Y. MCMULLEN, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: FORM, ANALYSIS, & INTERPRETATION 681-719 (4th ed. 1962).
' In 1962, the Comptroller, apparently in an attempt to head off legislation extending the federal securi-
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Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), or state supervisory agencies, were largely
identical in format. They were filed quarterly with the agencies but were typically
published, as required, twice a year. The similarity in the statements' appearance
belied the lack of uniformity in the accounting principles employed in their preparation. Statements of one bank could not be safely compared with those of another, and
the prescribed forms made no provision for footnotes to explicate the figures and the
accounting techniques followed in arriving at them. Statements of financial condition did not reveal earnings except as they might perhaps be deducible by comparison
of surplus and undivided profit figures with the same accounts disclosed in earlier
statements; comparative figures, showing changes from one statement to the next,
were never required and seldom provided. While most supervisory authorities did
require the filing of annual reports of earnings and dividends, these were unavailable
to the public.
The accounting principles employed in assembling statements of condition pursuant to supervisory requirements were selected out of a maximum regard for accounting conservatism,' and the resulting financial statements were rendered more obscure
on that account. Conservatism was consciously employed in the interest of providing
the maximum protection for depositors, whose confidence was deemed both essential
and precarious and whose well-being was the sole object of the bank supervisors.
Little attention was paid to the needs of bank shareholders and potential investors;
both as a cause and as an effect of the low visibility of bank earning power, investor
disinterest in bank stocks as growth investments prevailed for a long time.
Instances of the long-established conservatism in bank financial reporting are
discussed at length in the rest of this article. It suffices to note here, as examples of
the obscurantism practiced in the interest of depositors, the quick writing off, or
writing down to nominal values, of the bank's fixed assets and the creation of reserves
not revealed on the balance sheet. These particular practices even made comparison
of the equity portion of the balance sheet from year to year unhelpful as a means
of evaluating earning power since neither retained earnings nor the impact of inordinate gains or losses in the bond account or losses in the loan account could be
determined.
While the slow progress in bank accounting is most directly attributable to
supervisors' and bankers' primary concern with the safety of deposits and the
preservation of depositor confidence, there is reason to believe that the emerging new
emphasis on accounting principles to be employed in reporting to shareholders will
sooner or later change banks' practices in accounting to depositors and supervisory
ties laws to banks, adopted requirements for annual reports to shareholders of national banks and attempted
to provide other investor protections analogous to -those in the securities laws; the required annual report
was to contain comparative balance sheets and income statements and a reconciliation of the capital
account. 27 Fed. Reg. 12811 (1962). See SPECIAL STUDY REPORT, Pt. 3, at 390See H. W. BEvis, CORPORATE FINANCIAL REPORTING IN A COMPETITIVE ECONoMY 86 (1965):
"Authorities supervising banks . . . have historically tended to require or permit the affected corporations
to use those accounting practices which emphasize liquidity."
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agencies. According to one writer, "the question is whether banks, supervisors, and
the banking public are not now sophisticated enough to deal with banking facts as
they are, without the psychological cushioning that certain time-honored practices
seem to provide."'10 Certainly the presence of deposit insurance greatly diminishes the
need to tailor financial disclosure to depositors' special requirements. Both for this
reason and because the new accounting principles being developed portray more
accurately the bank's true condition, the trends we trace below may ultimately extend
to all bank accounting. Statements produced in accordance with the accounting
principles being evolved should be more useful to all concerned with any bank, either
as a money-making business or as a depository of funds.
II
EFFECTs OF THE SECURITIES AcTs AMENDMENTS OF

x964

A. Banks and the Securities Laws
Banks were exempted from the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of
1933," probably because of a general belief that bank supervision would protect the
various interests of the public, including those of shareholders.' 2 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contained no such exemption for banks from the requirements for
periodic reporting of financial information to the Securities and Exchange Commission (for insertion in public files, which are regularly consulted by the financial community). Nevertheless, the SEC promptly exempted banks from the reporting and
other requirements as a "temporary" measure.'3 Since only bank securities listed
on securities exchanges would be subject to the 1934 act requirements anyway and
since bank stocks were traded almost exclusively over the counter,' 4 there was never
any particular reason for the SEC to set aside this exemption, and it remained in
effect up until 1964. Thus, before the 1964 amendments, the securities laws did
not affect banks at all in their relations with investors in bank stocks except as certain
antifraud provisions applied."5
The Special Study of Securities Markets in 1963 proposed the extension of the
1934 act's reporting, proxy, and insider-trading rules to certain unlisted securities, and
specifically recommended that no exception be made for banks.'" The ensuing legislaHexter, Disclosure or State Banks, AUDITGRAM, June 1965, at 4, 46.
1 Securities Act of 1933, S 3(a) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (2) (1964).
See SPECIAL STuoy REPORT, pt. 3, at 36. See generally Comment, Banks and the Securities Act o1

20
12

z933, 52 VA. L. REv. 117 (z966), reprinted in 84 BANKING LJ. 95 (z967), arguing that (r) there
was in 1933 no basis for concluding that bank supervisors were adequately looking out for shareholders'
interests, and (2) the 1933 act exemption is inappropriate today as well.
is 17 C.F.R. § 240.12a-i (1964).
"Only five banks had securities listed on registered national securities exchanges in 1963. SPECIAL
Srua REPoRT, Pt. 3, at 36. Each of these enjoyed a special exemption from Rule 12a-i. 2 L. Loss,
SEctiUrss REGUnITION 800 (2d ed. z961).
"Securities Act of 1933, §§ 12(2), 17, 15 U.S.C. S§ 771(2), 77q (1964); Securities Exchange Act of
8
1934, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 7 j (1964).
'a SPEczAL STuDY REPORT, Pt. 3, at 35-39.
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tion in 1964 made a concession to banks only by vesting the new regulatory authority
over each federally insured bank in the respective federal agency responsible for
supervising the bank generally." Depriving the SEC of its accustomed authority
has resulted in the development of highly specialized accounting requirements for the
banking industry. Dividing the new regulatory authority three ways has produced
some differences in the accounting practices and principles prescribed for the various
classes of banks. The recent publication by the Comptroller of more detailed accounting regulations for national banks' s has narrowed the divergencies substantially, but
some still remain and are mentioned below.
The Securities Acts Amendments extended the 1934 act's reporting, proxy, and

insider-trading requirements to corporations having over $I million in assets and 500
or more shareholders.' 9 These numerical tests greatly limit the law's application to
commercial banks and hence weaken the statutory sanction for the disclosure sought
in the banking industry. Thus, the new law extends coverage to only about 6oo of
the nation's nearly iz4,ooo banks, although the securities of these banks are held by
some i,6ooooo shareholders and represent thirty-six per cent of the outstanding
20
In
securities of those banks whose securities have evoked some trading interest.
shareholders
to
reports
annual
concerning
addition, the Comptroller's regulations
purport to cover all national banks (some 4,8oo institutions), not merely those newly
"2
subject to the 934 act.2 The Federal Reserve and the FDIC have not gone so far.
It is widely believed, however, that smaller banks will gradually be influenced to
adopt the accounting principles and some of the reporting practices prescribed by the
federal agencies. Nevertheless, the chances for achieving greater accounting uniformity by voluntary adherence to regulatory prescriptions would probably be enhanced if the three federal banking agencies could agree on a common regulation.
To date this has not been done.
The three banking agencies set out in two different directions to implement
their new authority under the 1964 amendments. The Federal Reserve immediately joined forces with the FDIC and promptly produced substantially
identical regulations.2 3 (The Federal Reserve's version is called Regulation F, to
1 x5 U.S.C. § 7 81(i) (1964). Thus, the Comptroller is responsible for national banks, the Federal
Reserve for state member banks, and the FDIC for insured state nonmember banks. Uninsured nonmember banks would be subject to the SEC's jurisdiction; however, Chairman Cary estimated in 1963
that only four banks meeting the jurisdictional requirements would fall in this last category. S. REP. No.
379, 88th Cong., ist Sess. 51 (3963) (letter from Chairman William L. Cary to Senator A. Willis
Robertson).
8 Comptroller of the Currency Reg. §§ 18.1-.7, 32 Fed. Reg. 7071 (1967).

20 15 U.s.C. § 781(g) (1964).
(letter from Chairman William L. Cary to
0S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 52 (x963)
Senator A. Willis Robertson).
as Comptroller of the Currency Reg. § 10.1, 32 Fed. Reg. 7070 (x967).
" See Bank Disclosure: Another Step Forward, BANK STocK Q., March 1967, at 15, for the view
that "there is no valid reason for any bank, regardless of size, to be exempt from disclosure provisions."
28 12 C.F.R. §§ 2o6.i-.71, 335.I-71 (Supp. 1966).
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which we shall refer hereafter.) These regulations required, among other things,
that statements disseminated by a bank in connection with its annual stockholders'
meeting should be a "fair presentation" when "considered as a whole.., in the light
of the financial statements of the bank filed or to be filed" with the agency, and
prescribed in considerable detail the matter to be contained in the latter statements2
The Comptroller of the Currency, on the other hand, confined himself to the continuation of his pre-existing requirement that annual reports be provided to shareholders, adding a provision to the effect that filing of a copy of the annual report
with him would constitute registration under the Exchange Act 2 The Comptroller's
regulations initially included no accounting rules or requirements whatsoever and
consequendy left national banks free to follow practices inconsistent not only
with each other but also with state banks subject to Federal Reserve and FDIC regu26

lation.

In 1967, the Comptroller has finally promulgated some brief but effective accounting regulations that considerably narrow the gap between his requirements and those
of Regulation F 2 7 Differences persist, however, most particularly in several of the
areas discussed later in this article. Moreover, the Comptroller's rules omit to prescribe the treatment of certain items, such as long-term lease commitments, on which
Regulation F takes an express position. As to all of these matters, it would be
desirable if the Comptroller's regulations would conform to Regulation F, since the
Regulation F treatment is generally preferable from an accounting standpoint. On
the other hand, the Comptroller's regulations represent a salutary advance over
Regulation F in prescribing a precise format in which the balance sheet, earnings
statement, and reconciliation of reserves must be presented to shareholders; Regulation F's rules have governed the form of shareholder reports only indirectly by
requiring that they be a "fair presentation" of the data supplied to the Board. The
Comptroller's prescribed format should do much toward producing uniformity and
comparability among the banks complying with it.
B. The Issue of Certification and Independent Audit"
The early drafts of Regulation F included a requirement that the financial statements included in a bank's annual report to shareholders be certified by an inde24 12

C.F.R. § 206.5, 2o6.IO3 (Supp. I966).

25 29 Fed. Reg. 12300 (1964).

" The conflict which thus developed between the Federal Reserve and the Comptroller was typical
of a series of conflicting legal interpretations adopted by the agencies in recent years. These conflicts
have contributed to creating a competitive disadvantage for state banks. See, e.g., Symposium-Banking
Regulation, 31 LAW & CoNTEMp. PRoB. 635 (1966).
"' Comptroller of the Currency Reg. §§ 8.x-.7, 32 Fed. Reg. 7071 (1967).
"The Federal Reserve's position on long-term lease commitments appears in 12 C.F.R. §2o6.7(c) (8)
(Supp. 1966).
"For recent and thorough discussions, see Larsen, The Controversy Over Independent Audits for
Banks, J. AcCOUNTANcY, May 1967, at 42; Walker & Mellilo, What the Nen Regulations Mean to Banks,
Psuca WATEPaHOUsE RaV., Spring 1965, at 4, 6-io; Bettauer, Should Banks Have Independent Audits?,
PaicE XVATERousE REv., Winter 1965, at 14.
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pendent public accountant. Such a certification would, of course, entail an audit "in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards" and the expression of an
opinion as to the conformity of the statements with "generally accepted accounting
principles." An audit meeting such standards and supporting such an opinion
would be an expensive undertaking. A bank having a set of strong internal controls
could be audited more easily than one not having adequate internal auditing procedures, but the evaluation of the controls employed and the making of necessary
tests to verify their effectiveness is nevertheless difficult and to a considerable extent
duplicative. ° Moreover, the regulatory agencies' bank examiners perform some of
the same functions that an auditor would perform.3 ' Because the internal audit staffs
of the large banks to be covered by Regulation F were deemed largely adequate, at
least when backstopped by regular governmental supervision, the Federal Reserve
dropped the requirement of independent certification in the final version of Regulation F.3 2 The Comptroller has imposed no certification requirement.
The question of the need for independent audit of bank financial statements is still
very much alive, however. Occasional bills in Congress,3 3 representatives of the
accounting profession 4 and of the investment community, 5 and some bank regulators3 6 have expressed the view that independent audits of banks should be required.
The debate is likely to continue, but it is believed by this writer that certification
will usually not be worth what it costs until such time as bank accounting principles
are better defined than they are at the moment. A certification that statements have
been prepared "in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles" is of
little value if such principles have not been agreed upon in some measure; indeed,
the certification may render the statements more misleading by seeming to warrant
their comparability with financial statements of other banks or even with those of
firms in other industries.
A number of banks throughout the country believe that their responsibility to their
shareholders and the investing public requires them to employ independent accounting
firms to certify the financial statements in their annual reports. Despite these cer-

" Some of the larger banks maintaining substantial internal audit departments have employed outside
accounting firms to evaluate the scope and effectiveness of the internal audit program. Such reviews cost
less than a complete audit of the bank, yet contribute substantially to the improvement of bank accounting.
"The differences outnumber the similarities, however, and should be stressed.
2 12 C.F.R. § 2o6.7(b) (Supp. 1966). Unlike the Comptroller's regulations, Regulation F does require
an opinion as to the financial statements by the bank's principal accounting officer and auditor if an independent accountant's certification is not obtained. 32 C.F.R. § 2o6.2(dd) (Supp. 1966). The accountant's
opinion, if supplied, however, must be more comprehensive than that required of the bank's own accounting officer. 12 C.F.R. §§ 2o6.7(b)(2), 2o6.7(b) ( 3 )(ii) (Supp. 1966). See Walker & Mellilo, supra
note 29, at 6-7.
"5E.g., H.R. 40, 89 th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. 123, 89th Cong., sst Sess. (1965).
" E.g., Letter from Committee on Bank Accounting and Auditing, AICPA, to Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, Nov. 9, 3964, reprintedin J. ACCOUNTANCY, Dec. 3964, at 59.
a See, e.g., Cony, Bank-Report Fracas, Wall Street Journal, June 4, 3965, at i, col. i.
58 E.g., Hearings on the Crown Savings Bank Failure Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Finance of
the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89 th Cong., ist Sess. 580-83, 585 (1965) (testimony of
K. A. Randall, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
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tifications, however, there persists a lack of uniformity in the accounting practices
employed. While the CPAs' reports are objective, they have adopted varying treatments of such important items as the reserve for bad debts and the gains or losses on
securities transactions0 7 Clearly, the desired accounting results cannot be achieved
simply by turning each bank's problems over to a CPA.
Surprisingly, the use of independent accountants has not been confined to large
banks alone. Small banks which are unable to support a substantial internal audit
staff are more and more frequently utilizing the services of outside auditors to meet
their needs. This is a healthy trend, and it is the opinion of this writer that, as the
need for sound audit programs is more widely recognized, the use of independent
accounting firms will spread more rapidly among smaller banks than among large
ones.
Ill
ACHIEVING UNIFORMITY: SPECIFIC

IssUEs

RESOLVED

In the development of Regulation F, the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC
recognized the need to establish uniform accounting practices to support the financial
statements to be required if they were to achieve any significant degree of uniformity
and comparability. They sought the opinions of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA), the Financial Analysts Federation, the Association for
Bank Audit, Control, and Operation (known as "NABAC"), the American Bankers
Association, and the New York Clearing House Association.
As of this writing, the AICPA has not developed or agreed upon "generally
accepted accounting principles for banks," although a draft booklet bearing that title
has been circulated by its Committee on Bank Accounting and Auditing. Accountants
and bankers are very much at work on the problems, and some broad agreement may
soon be reached. For the moment, however, the Federal Reserve's Regulation F
provides the most definitive guide to bank accounting principles. The ensuing discussion of some of the specific issues relies principally on Regulation F as the
authority for calling the questions settled. Accountants and some bankers may not
be satisfied on some of the points, and on several issues, as is indicated, the Comptroller
has just taken a slightly divergent position or has taken no position at all. Never" Some question might be raised as to how accountants have been able to give "clean" opinions on
financial statements incorporating unusual accounting techniques peculiar to banks. One writer suggests
that it has been done "presumably on the theory that the results of these practices did not preclude a 'fair
presentation' and in a spirit of temporary acceptance of 'special-interest' accounting for banks." Doherty,
The Banker and the CPA: Some Matters of Mutual Interest, ARTHUR YOUNG J., Spring 1967, at 2, 8.
The accountant's problem is similar to that encountered in other regulated industries where regulators
insist on accounting treatments not deemed "generally accepted" by the certifying accountant. See Price,
Walker & Spacek, .4ccounting Uniformity in the Regulated Industries, 30 LAw & CONTPMP. PRoB. 824

(1965).
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theless, Regulation F remains our chief and most comprehensive authority on bank
accounting.3 8
A. Accrual Accounting
Despite the recognition that accrual accounting has been accepted by most
business ventures of any consequence, it has not been uniformly adopted by commercial banks 3 9 Accrual accounting, which is the only method giving recognition
to revenues and expenses in the period to which they relate, rather than in the
period when they were actually received or paid, provides the only true basis for
adequate financial reporting. It was the consensus of all of the interested parties
presenting opinions to the Federal Reserve Board that Regulation F should incorporate the requirement that all financial reports be prepared on the basis of
accrual accounting; an exception was made with regard to trust fees and commissions because of their lack of predictability and because of a lack of materiality. As
a consequence the Federal Reserve Board in its general instruction covering the
40
preparation of financial statements included the following:
Accrual Accounting.
Financial statements shall generally be prepared on the basis of accrual accounting whereby all revenues and all expenses shall be recognized during the period
earned or incurred regardless of the time received or paid, with certain exceptions:
(a) income on securities in the trading account and (b) where the results would
be only insignificantly different on a cash basis, or where accrual is not feasible....
2.

While the Comptroller's new regulations apply to all national banks, the requirement of accrual accounting is extended only to the larger banks 1 Thus, banks with
assets of less than $ioo million need not comply immediately, and banks having
less than $25 million in resources are not to be subjected to the broad accrual accountig requirement 2 However, all national banks must, for fiscal years beginning in
1968 and thereafter, either handle income from installment loans and the related
taxes on an accrual basis or, alternatively, provide a footnote indicating the amount
of unearned discount on installment loans that is being carried in the capital accounts.

As under Regulation F, trust department income may be reported on a cash basis.
"s Other authoritative, though unofficial, sources include Chaut, Progress Report of the Bank SubCommittee of the Corporate Information Committee, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., Nov.-Dec. 1966, at ii;
COMITTEE ON BANK ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING,

AICPA,
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PRACTIcES AND TEm RELATIONsMP TO GENERAL.Y AccEPrED ACCOUNTINo PRINCIPLES (1966), published
only to serve as a basis for discussion among interested parties in the banking field; NABAC, SEcuamEs
ACCouNTING (Accounting Bulletin No. I, rev. 1966); NABAC, LOAN Loss AND RELATED REsEvE AccourING (Accounting Bulletin No. 3, 1966); NABAC, ACCOUNTING FOR BANK PREsIES, EQUiPmENT AND
OmER REAL ESrATE OwNED (Accounting Bulletin No. 4, 1966); E. LERNER, supra note 6.
"9See Austin, A Survey of Accounting and Reporting Practices, AuDsTrAe, Feb. 1964, at 4, 5do X2 C.F.R. § 2o6.7I (Supp. 1966) (Form F-9).
"Comptroller of the Currency Reg. § 18.3, 32 Fed. Reg. 7071 (1967).
2
Austin, supra note 39, discloses the results of a survey indicating that the great majority of banks
having less than $25 million in deposits employ the cash method or a combination of cash and accrual
accounting.
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B. Accretion of Discount
A second item of controversy in the development of Regulation F was the matter
of the accretion of discount. It was recognized that income on bonds purchased at
a discount, where the discount is not amortized, is reflected at the coupon rate rather
than the yield basis and may therefore materially understate revenues.
The treatment of discount on securities had varied widely between banks, as had
the treatment of bond premium. Among the prevalent practices for the treatment
of bond premium was the write-off of such premiums to the undivided profits account
at the date of acquisition. Other banks amortized the premium against operating
earnings to the maturity of the bond acquired, while a variation on this practice included the amortization of such premiums to the call date of the security. Prior to
1955, few if any banks accreted the discount on bonds purchased below par. Normally, such securities were carried at cost on the books of the bank with the full
capital gains being taken at the maturity of the security. There seems to be little
rationale for this difference in treatment of premium and discount, but the results
of the varying methods of treatment had a direct impact on the comparability of
earnings statements and balance sheets.
The Internal Revenue Code allows the amortization of bond premiums for tax
purposes, 4 3 but, as is frequently the case, tax accounting methods are not necessarily
reflected on the books of the bank, such tax adjustments being made through memoranda records. In the case of a bank which charged the premium directly to undivided profits at the date of acquisition, the bonds were shown on the balance sheet
at par while the earnings statement reflected the full coupon income. For those
banks that amortized such premiums, the bonds were carried at the unamortized
value, and the amortized premium offset to a degree the coupon income in the
earnings statement. If the amortization were to an earlier call date, the amount of
such amortization would be increased and the coupon rate decreased commensurately.
Here again, the majority opinion favored the accrual of such discounts in order that
the operating statements of the bank would reflect the true yield on securities acquired
rather than the coupon rate. As a consequence, the instructions relating to the
4
required financial statements under Regulation F include the following :
2. Investment securities....

(b) Book value ... shall be cost adjusted for amortization of premium and,
at the option of the bank, for accretion of discount. If the reporting
bank does not accrete discount, the amount that could have been accreted
shall be set forth in a footnote.
The option on accretion of discount and the last sentence were included as a result of
representations made by various banks to the supervisory authorities as to the cost
involved in the bookkeeping functions necessary to meet a hard and fast requirement.
,INT.
REV. CODE Of 1954, § 171.
1&I2C.F.R. § 2o6.7I (Supp. 1966)

(Form F-9 A).
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The Comptroller's regulations take a somewhat different approach to this problem, leaving accretion of discount in the bank's discretion but requiring disclosure
only where there is an actual accrual and the amount is five per cent or more of bond
income.45 Thus, national banks need not report in any form the effects of purchasing securities at a discount, while banks subject to Federal Reserve or FDIC
regulation must disclose all relevant information in the statements or in a footnote
thereto.
C. Valuation of Fixed Assets
The valuation of fixed assets is another area where bank accounting has differed
materially from generally accepted accounting principles. In the interest of conservatism, investments in banking premises have in many instances been written
down to nominal values, or substantial reserves have been allocated against values
in excess of the depreciation allowances under the Internal Revenue regulations.
Similarly, the items of furniture, fixtures, and equipment have been charged to
operating expense as opposed to their capitalization and their true worth thereby
extracted from the balance sheet.
In establishing the reporting requirements, the Federal Reserve and the FDIC
were in agreement that the cost basis was necessary to any reliable objective and consistent financial recording and reporting. Here again, it was the consensus that, in
the interests of sound accounting practice, the traditional write-down of assets should
be abandoned and the assets reported at cost less accrued depreciation. Similar
treatment was to be afforded leasehold improvements. These new practices reflect
the application of accounting principles long "generally accepted" by the accounting
profession.
During the course of discussions, it was represented to the supervisory agencies
that the restoration of values written down in prior years would be extremely difficult
to accomplish because of the length of time during which the practice had been
in vogue and because many of the properties had been acquired through merger
and the write-downs had occurred while the properties were held by a predecessor
bank. For these reasons, Regulation F included a modifying instruction:46
5. Bank inemises and equipment....
(b) All fixed assets acquired subsequent to December 3, 1959, shall be stated at
cost less accumulated depreciation or amortization.
(c) All fixed assets acquired prior to January i, i96o, that are not presently
accounted for by the bank on the basis of cost less accumulated depreciation or
amortization, may be stated at book value. Any such assets that are still in use and
would not have been fully depreciated on a straight-line method of accounting for
depreciation if the bank had recorded depreciation on such basis shall be described
briefly in a footnote, together with an explanation of the accounting that was used
with respect to such assets.
"'Comptroller of the Currency Reg. § i8.5(b), 32 Fed. Reg. 7071 (1967).
&a12 C.F.R. § 2o6.7I (Supp. 1966) (Form F-9A).
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This was undoubtedly a compromise with objective reporting, but, based upon
representations made to the regulatory authorities, failure to reach such a compromise
would have created serious problems in the determination of cost less allowable
depreciation.
The Comptroller's new regulations provide that "all fixed assets acquired subsequent to June 30, 1967, shall be stated at cost less accumulated depreciation or
amortization." 7 The cut-off date might have been fixed earlier, it would seem, but
the principle of allocating the cost of fixed assets over the time during which they
are employed, a principle essential to any meaningful system of financial reporting,
has at least been recognized and established for the future. As the effects of the old
accounting treatment dissipate with the passage of time, greater comparability will
gradually emerge. Still, the agencies might have done more to hasten the day when
bank fixed assets would all be accounted for alike.
D. Stock Dividends Issued
A fourth area of controversy in bank accounting concerns the proper treatment of
stock dividends issued. The proposal has been made that stock dividends should
be capitalized at the market value of such shares at the date of issue rather than at
their par value as has been traditional with banks. The AICPA's Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43 suggests that capitalization at par value is the accounting treatment preferred by the accounting profession; 4 this accepted principle attempts to
record the substance of the transaction rather than its form. In the discussions
on this point in connection with the promulgation of Regulation F, the AICPA represented that their own Accounting Research Bulletin defined the generally accepted
accounting principle for such transactions and urged its inclusion in the regulation.
The groups representing the banks were of the opinion that, because of the significance of retained earnings in bank capitalization, the circumstances involved
in bank stock dividends differentiated them from those of industry. They proposed
that it is in the best interests of the shareholders and therefore incumbent upon
bank management to increase the permanent capitalization of the bank as rapidly as
possible by the transfer of earnings from undivided profits to the surplus account.
Bank surplus, unlike industry surplus, represents relatively permanent capitalization
and is the basis for certain legal restrictions placed upon the growth and activities of
the bank. If funds are accumulated in the undivided profits account for the payment of a stock dividend, these legal restrictions may prevent a bank from increasing
its loan limit, may limit the investment that it can make in banking houses, or may
restrict the number of offices that may be established, all of which consequences
would be contrary to the best interests of the shareholders. In addition, banks
'"Comptroller of the Currency Reg. § 18.7(d) (3), 32 Fed. Reg. 7072 (1967).
" AICPA, AccouNTING RSFARCH AND TERMINOLoGY BULLETINS 59-65 (final ed. 196).
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have traditionally presented but one surplus account, which may be made up of
both paid-in surplus and earned surplus.
Stock dividends of banks may be declared from surplus or from undivided profits.
To the extent that they are declared from surplus, they represent only a restatement
of permanent capital; shareholder equities are not affected by such a transfer, for
each shareholder retains the same interest in the total equities of the corporation.
As a consequence of discussions of this issue and the representations made concerning it, Regulation F made no change in the historic treatment of stock dividends
declared by banks, providing for capitalization at par value.49 The Comptroller's
new regulations give no guidance at all on the question. In the absence of
specific instructions on this particular point, banks are likely to continue the historic
practice, followed by other banks, of capitalizing stock dividends at the par value
of the shares issued rather than at their fair market value at the time of issue.
Comparability within the banking industry is thus not impaired by the difference in
regulatory handling of this subject.
E. Disclosure of Market Value of Securities
During the development of the current regulations, it was advocated by some that
banks disclose in their published statements the market value of securities held at
the date of the statement.50 Bankers in general were opposed to such disclosure, and
their position was supported by the FDIC. Banks maintained that this figure represented the situation at a given point in time and was of no continuing significance or
benefit. The analysts, on the other hand, contended that only by a disclosure of

such current market values could they appraise m anagement's performance in the
handling of the security portfolio and develop analyses relative to the yields currently
achieved.
Disclosure of market value of the investment portfolio in periods of a depressed
securities market could lead to a lack of confidence on the part of depositors, with
possibly disastrous effects on the entire banking system. The banks are, of course,
under no compulsion to dispose of their securities at the values indicated and may
well intend to hold such securities to maturity or for a market rise. The disclosure
of existing losses in the portfolio could, however, jeopardize depositor confidence,
particularly if such depressed values indicated a substantial impairment of capital.
Following a weighing of the depositor interest against that of the investor and,
indeed, the possible effect of such disclosure on the national economy, a current value
disclosure requirement was omitted from the Federal Reserve's regulations. In the
final analysis, it is believed that little would be gained by the disclosure of such
information and that under some circumstances the results could be catastrophic.
12 C.F.R. § 2o6.71 (Supp. 1966) (Form F-9C, item io).
o See generally, for earlier advocacy of such disclosure, Hill, TailoringBanks' Annual Reports for Both
Depositors and Stockholders (pts. 1-2), BANKING, April x959, at 40 , May 1959, at 54.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

IV
ACHIEVING UNIFORMITY: OUTSTANDING ISSUES

Among the subjects of continuing discussion in bank financial reporting is the
possible adoption of the so-called "all-inclusive" income statement. This concept
means simply that the income statement should reflect all income and expense items,
including even extraordinary, nonrecurring items; the alternative approach reflects

the idea that the income statement should reveal current operating performance and
that extraordinary items, unrelated to operations for the period, should by-pass the
income statement and be directly credited to or charged against the capital accounts.
The SEC and the AICPA have tended to favor the all-inclusive income statement,
although extraordinary items are expected to be presented "below the line," as additions to or deductions from net operating income in arriving at net income.P1 In
banking, the debate has centered on two important items, the creation of a bad
debt reserve and the treatment of gains or losses on securities transactions. There are
substantial reasons why the generally preferred all-inclusive income statement would
be detrimental to the best interests of banks and investors in bank securities.
Regulation F did not purport to resolve the debate over the proper function of
the income statement. It compromised on the question of presentation, showing
first "net operating earnings" and ultimately, after "nonoperating" items, a figure
labelled "transferred to undivided profits"; no "net income" figure is shown."2
More important, Regulation F does not satisfactorily resolve the problems raised by
1

" SEC Accounting Ser. Release No. 70, Dec. 2o, x95o; ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, AICPA,
REPORTING THE RESULTS OF OPERATIONS (Opinion No. 9, 1966). In its recent opinion the Accounting

Principles Board stated "A committee of the [AICPA] is in the process of recommending a format for the
income statement of commercial banks. Until such recommendation has been given and until the
Board has taken a position thereon, this Opinion is not applicable to commercial banks." Id. at para. 6.
5212 C.F.R. § 2o6.71 (Supp. x966) (Form F-9B). Accountants have been generally critical of the
failure to state a net income figure. E.g., Doherty, supra note 37, at 11, 15. Securities analysts have
likewise sought more meaningful income figures. E.g., Cates, fsupra note 4, at 14-15. A recent article,
Bank Earnings and the Bottom Line, BANK STOCK Q., March x967, at 6,emphasizes the unreliability to
investors of the "net operating earnings" figure. The following conclusions, indicating the significance
of the so-called "bottom line," are extremely pertinent:
"Last year's bottom line for the 25-bank group was $782.9 million, or 17.8 per cent less than
the $952.2 million aggregate of earnings reported by the individual banks .. . . The difference
of $i69.3 million represents $i21.5 million net losses taken on sales of securities, $46.9 million loan
charge-offs net of recoveries, and $o.9 million net sundry debits--all after related taxes ....
"Because of the nature of the banking business, one year's results may not be conclusive. Interest earned on loans and investments made today is included in current operating revenues, but
losses or gains on these earning assets are not known until later. The bottom line over a period of
years provides a more meaningful accounting of the lending, investing, and operating policies of
banks.
"In the seven years, 196o-I966 inclusive, net operating earnings of the 25 banks amounted to
$5,468.9 million. The bottom line, however, totaled $5,254.4 million, an attrition of 3.9 per cent.
The difference of $214.5 million resulted from $22.9 million net gains realized on sales of securities,
$230.9 million net loan losses, and $6.5 million other net charges--all after related taxes.
"Net securities gains of $144.4 million realized in the six years, i96o-i965, were followed
by record losses of $i2i.5 million taken in x966. It was a 'loss' year for banks."
Id. at 7-8 (italics in original).
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bad debt reserves and securities transactions, assigning both to "below the line" status
even though each may have elements of current expense or income. Both issues are
thus intertwined with the functional concept of the income statement.
A. Bad Debt Reserves
While there can be no quarrel with the theory that some charge for possible losses
in the loan account should be made against current operating earnings, there have
not at the present time been established any criteria for the determination of the
proper amount of this charge.

Suggestions have been made that the charge to

current operating earnings should represent the average loss experience for a five-year
period, a ten-year period, or a twenty-year period. Those advocating the five-year
period make the point that only by using the most recent data will the content of the
loan portfolio approximate the same type of loans as those existing during the
current accounting period; thus, the loss ratio encountered during the most recent
time interval is that most likely to continue with each successive accounting
period. On the other hand, those advocating the longer time interval point

out that a five-year span is too short a time to include the effect of the extremes of
the economic cycle. In the case of catastrophic losses, such as those resulting from
the recent vegetable oil scandal or those of banks participating in a recent substantial
credit transaction with a large national industrial company, the five-year average
can be substantially distorted. In the case of the loans to the industrial company
referred to, recovery was obtained within a five-year period, which would have the
effect of minimizing the charge against current operating earnings in those years following the recovery after the charge-off was excluded from the average. It would even
be possible under such circumstances for the five-year average to result in a net credit,
which on its face would be ridiculous. 53 For one bank affected by this particular

loan, the five-year average ranged from .o8 per cent to .0024 per cent as the effect of
the recovery was realized.
Another approach advocated by some has been that a determination should be
made by management at the end of each accounting period of those loans which
represent potential losses and that a charge should be made against current operating
earnings in such an amount. Opposing this, of course, is the weight of authority that
financial statements should be based upon objective accounting and not upon subjective interpretation. As is pointed out in the AICPA's Accounting Research
Bulletin No. 43, "an important objective of income presentation should be the
avoidance of any practice that leads to income equalization."
Certainly, a subjective determination of potential loan losses could easily lead to income equalization.
"'This could occur where a large recovery was counted in the five-year average but the loss that it
related to was not. Sound accounting would not allow this to happen, of course, and would exclude the
recovery unless the loss was also included in the average.
" AICPA, ACCoUNTING RESEARCH AND TERMINOLOGY BuLLETiNs 59 (final ed. ig6i).
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Under existing Internal Revenue regulations, banks are accorded special treatment in the establishment of reserves for bad debts. At the present time, they are
permitted to accumulate a reserve for bad debts equal to 2.4 per cent of outstanding
loans at the year end, subject to certain exclusions. " This figure can be accumulated
over a ten-year period resulting in an allocation each year of .24 per cent, which may
be substantially above the actual or average loss experience of a given bank. In the
event that the allocation permitted by the Treasury regulations substantially exceeded
the actual experience of a given bank, that bank would indeed be reluctant to show
as a charge against current operating earnings the maximum provision permitted for
tax purposes. On the other hand, not to make a full allocation of the allowable
amount with its consequent tax savings would be an act of poor management and
would be to the detriment of the investor.
With their year-end statements at December 31, 1965, several banks initiated a
policy of including in their operating statement a charge for bad debts. There was
no uniformity for the basis of these charges; thus, comparability of the final figure
has not been attained. Nonetheless, this is a recognition on the part of these banks
that current operating earnings must somehow bear the losses incurred or to be incurred in the loan portfolio. In at least one case, the difference between the charge
to current operating earnings and that permitted under the Internal Revenue formula
was reported as a charge against undivided profits. Such an approach satisfies the
accounting requirement of a charge to operating earnings and at the same time obtains
for the bank the maximum tax benefit to be gained under the allowable formula.
It is doubtful that any significant degree of uniformity in the treatment of the
bad debt provision will be obtained unless the regulatory authorities set forth regulations governing the point. At the present time, Regulation F "' and the Comptroller's
regulations57 provide that the total charge for the bad debt provision will be shown
as a "below-the-line" item wholly excluded from the report of net operating earnings.
While this approach is not altogether satisfactory, to include the total amount set
aside as a charge against earnings under the "all-inclusive" principle would result in
an even more substantial distortion of the actual operating profits. Moreover, it
would not separate the risk element applicable to the existing loan portfolio from the
prudent reservation of a portion of undivided profits in contemplation of potential
catastrophic losses which may occur in periods of severe economic depression.
B. Security Transactions
With respect to the accounting treatment of banks' security gains and losses, the
unusual impact of the tax laws again produces artificially wide fluctuations from year
r' Rev. Rul. 65-92, 1965-1 Cum. Bull. ixs; Rev. Rul. 66-26, z966-i Cum. Bull. 4!.
IS12 C.F.R. § 2o6.71 (Supp. x966) (Form F-9B). The bad-debt reserve is to be reconciled in a
separate schedule. Id. (Form-9D, Schedule VII).
" Comptroller of the Currency Reg. §§ 18.2(a)-(b), 32 Fed. Reg. 7071 (1967). A reconcilement of
the reserve would appear separately. § x8.6(b), 32 Fed. Reg. 7072 (z967); Appendix D, id. at 7073
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to year. If the "all-inclusive" concept were adopted, these fluctuations would destroy
comparability between banks and distort year-to-year comparisons of statements of the
same bank.
In the treatment of security gains and losses, banks are accorded the usual right
under the Internal Revenue Code to claim the capital gains rate on profits on securities
held for a period of more than six months. At the same time, they are permitted to
deduct losses on securities sold at ordinary tax rates."' However, gains must be offset
against losses in a given year, and the tax treatment afforded the remainder will
be dictated by whether there is a net gain or a loss. 9 Under such circumstances, in
order to obtain the maximum tax benefit banks must avoid taking security gains and
losses in the same year and must strive to concentrate losses in one tax year and gains
in another. To include the results of such tax-inspired transactions in the bank's
annual report of net operating earnings would thus result in wide distortions and
serious misinterpretation.
Past practice in banks' treatment of security gains and losses has included the
carrying of the results of such transactions directly to the undivided profits account
or to reserves specifically provided for this purpose. If the annual reports did not
include a reconciliation of such reserves or of the undivided profits account, the investor or analyst would have no opportunity to ascertain the impact of such transaction on the equity portion of the balance sheet. Under the provisions of Regulation
F"° and of the Comptroller's new regulation," however, the results of such transactions must be shown as a "below-the-line" item. In addition, Regulation F 2 and the
Comptroller's regulations6 3 each require a reconciliation of the undivided profits
account and all reserves, thereby providing further disclosure as to the accumulated
results of the investment transactions.
In the event the principle of the "all-inclusive" income statement were adopted,
subjective thinking on the part of statement-conscious managements would dictate
that gains and losses be taken in a given year to offset the wide fluctuations presently
existing. Such a treatment would lose for the bank and for the shareholders the
benefits available under the tax laws and would be to their joint detriment. At
present, no system has been developed for allocating securities gains or losses among
accounting periods in such a way as to avoid the distorting impact of tax-inspired
transactions.
CONCLUSION

It will be seen from the above that there are still many variations in the financial
reporting of banks and in the philosophies behind such reporting. The most advanced
s INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 5 82(i).
'INr. REV. CODE Of I954, § 1231(a).
0 12 C.F.R. § 206.71 (Supp. 1966) (Form F-9 B).

"tComptroller of the Currency Reg. § 18.5(d), 32 Fed. Reg. 7071 (1967).
61

x2 C.F.R. § 2o6.71 (Supp. 1966) (Form F-9 C).
Comptroller of the Currency Reg. § i8.6, 32 Fed. Reg. 7071 (1967).
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requirement at the present time is represented by Regulation F of the Federal Reserve
Board and its FDIC counterpart. While the recent accounting rules of the Comptroller of the Currency are generally salutary, it is nevertheless to be hoped that the
Comptroller will adopt regulations for national banks under his supervision that are
substantively identical to Regulation F. The first step toward achieving industrywide accounting uniformity is to achieve uniformity on the part of the supervisory
authorities.
Needless to say, such regulatory uniformity would not provide answers to questions
relative to the "all-inclusive" income statement, nor would it necessarily comply
with the thinking of the financial analysts, the CPAs, and other interested parties.
A considerable controversy continues as the AICPA seeks to establish its "generally
accepted accounting principles for banks" in certain areas where the accountants'
approach differs from the philosophy of a large group of the major banks throughout
the country. It would appear, therefore, that the immediate objective is to obtain
uniform and comparable reporting on the part of all banks and subsequently to
reconcile such reporting practices with the proposals of the financial analysts and the
CPAs. Admittedly this will require time, but, with the increasing study currently
being devoted to the subject, we can look for continuing progress in this direction.

